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This article explores the importance of transnational forms of Muslim cultural
identity in northern Pakistan. By documenting the dynamism of a transnational
form of Muslim identity that encompasses people belonging to a wide range of
ethnic communities and Islamic doctrinal traditions, as well as extending
across countries whose Muslim peoples have experienced the differential
effects of their incorporation into both the Soviet Union and British India, the
author seeks to challenge the work of Islam specialists who emphasize the cen-
trality of “globalizing modernity” to the making of contemporary forms of
Muslim identity. In contrast, this article builds on historical accounts of premo-
dern forms of Muslim cosmopolitanism, notably Engseng Ho’s study of Hadrami
Muslim scholars who saw themselves as active creators of a universal world
structured around the transregional ideals of their faith in the expansive
Indian Ocean trading world. Building on this and other work on cosmopolitan-
ism, the author documents the ways in which older experiences of mobility in this
politically sensitive region of the world influence villagers’ present-day engage-
ments with globalizing processes. The ethnographic focus is on the ways in
which Sunni and Shi’a Ismai’li Chitrali Muslims interacted with refugees into
their region from Afghanistan and Tajikistan between 1979 and 2002, a time
when both countries were experiencing violent civil and international conflict.
THIS ARTICLE DRAWS ON my ethnographic work in villages and small towns in themountainous Chitral region of northern Pakistan. Chitral is populated predo-
minantly by Khowar-speaking Sunni and Ismai’li Muslims but shares a long border
with Afghanistan, which, especially since the start of violent conflict in Afghanistan
in the 1970s, has been exceptionally porous. Since 1979, Chitral has been home to
thousands of permanent and semipermanent Afghan refugees (muhajiran). In
addition, the region saw an influx of significant numbers of men from Tajikistan
who fled their country after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when a
civil war raged between rival regional factions seeking to secure power in Dush-
anbe. These transregional movements of people cut across the spatial configur-
ations of post-Soviet Central Asia and postcolonial South Asia and challenge the
relevance of these for understanding Muslim life in the region.
Magnus Marsden (mm101@soas.ac.uk) is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology with reference to
South and Central Asia in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London.
The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 67, No. 1 (February) 2008: 213–247.
© 2008 Association of Asian Studies Inc. doi: 10.1017/S0021911808000077
My interest in these connections ledme to travel to Tajikistan and Afghanistan
in 2005 in order to meet men who had once been “refugees” in Chitral yet who,
between 2001 and 2003, had mostly returned to their “homelands” (watanan).
During my stays in Chitral, I often meet and talk to “refugees” who live there.
Their presence is a focus for much discussion among Chitralis, who often
accuse these folk of having introduced “simple” Chitralis to a range of moral
vices, most notably heroin addiction. Yet all the Chitralis I know also emphasize
the important cultural and familial connections that exist between Chitral and
a wide range of ethnolinguistic communities living in neighboring regions of
Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
My concern here is with what Vinay Gidwani and K. Sivaramakrisnan (2003)
call “invisible histories of movement” between remote villages in an expansive
extranational mountain realm. This realm, however, lies at the “fringes of the
intellectual frameworks known as ‘area studies’” (Van Schendel 2002a, 647),
and its people have experienced the divisive effects of the geopolitics of the
Cold War. As a result, few scholars consider either the connections between
Muslims inhabiting the peripheries of South and Central Asia or the ways in
which these illuminate the nature of Muslim thought and self-understanding in
these settings and beyond. As is often noted in the case of other borderlands,
it would be tempting to think of Chitrali Muslims as, above all else, living at
the margins of the Pakistan nation-state and on the periphery of South Asia. In
contrast, this article “jumps scale” (Van Schendel 2002a) by considering the
wider regional and analytical significance of relationships between Chitrali
Muslims and their neighbors in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
A consideration of these transregional ways of being Muslim points toward
the significance of “identifications, hybrid identities, diasporic existences, min-
orities, and marginal communities” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 74) that remain over-
looked in much work on Islam within and beyond South Asia’s Muslim
societies. In particular, there is a growing body of work that gives the impression
that the most salient extranational forms of “Muslim identity” in Pakistan are
abstract, religious, created through the processes of globalizing modernity, and
tied to the displacement of older local identity registers (Roy 2004). Yet these
studies tend to overlook the role played by transregional dynamics in the
shaping of South Asian ways of being Muslim and both personal and collective
forms of self-understanding.1 The significance of work on “global Islam,”
moreover, has been further enhanced by the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001—an event that injected new relevance into understanding the so-called
radicalization and globalization of Muslim identities. The emergence of this
new gatekeeping concept for the study of Islam in South Asia, and more
1Anthropological studies of transnational life in a range of culturally fractured border zones often
deploy their ethnographic findings in order to question the “naturalness” of the nation as a category
of analyses (Gupta 1992, 64; Van Schendel 2002a, 139).
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particularly Pakistan, has meant that ways of being Muslim that are neither local
and vernacular nor fluid and limitlessly global are rarely the focus of sustained
investigation. What I also seek to emphasize, however, is that documenting the
multidimensionality of everyday Muslim identifications in a transregional
setting that traverses Central and South Asia contributes to rather than chal-
lenges older debates about the importance of bounded distinctions to Muslim
life.2
My concern with transregional forms of mobility and the forms of personal and
collective Muslim self-understanding they stimulate connects the findings pre-
sented here to anthropological work that theorizes types of identity “imaginings”
that are wider in scope than national, subnational, or ethnic (Gupta 1992; see
also Bayly 2004a, 2004b; Ho 2002). Much of this work addresses the opportunities
and problems posed by terms such as “globalization,” “cosmopolitanism,” and
“transnationalism” for analyzing “folk understandings of the global, and the prac-
tices with which they are intertwined” (Tsing 2002, 469). Many anthropologists,
for example, have contested the scholarly tendency to associate working-class
migrants exclusively with transnationalism, claiming that doing so denies such
people the possibility of embodying an “open-endendness” of cultural vision
(Werbner 1999). Cosmopolitanism and “open-ended” “subjectivities” that
enhance “potentialities for engagement with ‘otherness’” (Humphrey, Marsden,
and Skirvskaja, forthcoming), Pnina Werbner suggests, remain associated with
global cities and elites or places claimed by international trade and the global
traffic in meaning (Appadurai 1996; cf. Ferguson 1999, 211–21; Hannerz 1996;
see also Das and Poole 2003; Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Gupta 1992;
Pollock 2004; Tsing 2005; Van Schendel 2002b; Wilson and Donnan 1998). As a
result of these debates, there is now a wider recognition among anthropologists
of the ways in which open-ended subjectivities may emerge from rural–rural
migrations as much as they do from transnational movement (Gidwani and
Sivaramakrisnan 2003). Other scholars, however, have pointed toward the danger
of treating cosmopolitanism as simply reflecting the “celebration of cultural
sophistication.” Instead, they define cosmopolitanism as a discursive devise
through which “a specific and exclusive local identity” is “objectified and valorised”
(Osella and Osella 2007). Likewise, Anna Tsing has argued that by focusing on “his-
torically specific collaborations” rather than interactions between “globalizing”
forces and “local” visible in the simultaneous production of ideal forms of
cosmopolitan, openness for engagements with “otherness” and more vernacular
forms of collective self-understanding are made visible. Repeated interactions
between people from different backgrounds, she suggests, create “new interests
2I build on Mathijs Pelkmans’s call in his study of the Turkey–Ajaria border for the need to “move
beyond the discussion of whether borders are best defined in terms of fluidity or rigidity and
examine how these aspects are ultimately interconnected” (2006, 13).
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and identities” that are never to “everybody’s benefit” (2005, 126; see also Pollock
2004, 19–20).
What I find most useful about these debates about cosmopolitan forms of self-
understanding that are neither local, national, nor global is their recognition of the
ways in which even exclusive forms of identity arise from wider links, a process that
Engseng Ho refers to as “resolute localism” (2006, 68). Exclusive forms of
self-understanding, moreover, are not only the product of interactions between
openness and closedness: They are also often purposefully injected with a sense
of cosmopolitanism. This article, too, explores a highly particularistic set of cosmo-
politanism practices as they are enacted byMuslims living in a particular setting. By
documenting the ways in which village Muslims negotiate diverse registers of
allegiance and identity during the course of their daily lives, I seek to draw atten-
tion to the complexities ofMuslim life in a territorially porous and internally diverse
region, and to the important role that local practices and discourses of cosmopoli-
tanism play in shaping these negotiations. These practices lead to the production of
exclusive interests and identities. At the same time, they also call on the region’s
people to switch between very different indexes of being Muslim.
Anthropological work on Islam has been enriched in recent years by studies
focusing on the historical dynamism of connective Muslim life and the role of
these in Islam’s constitution as a world religion (cf. Bowen 1998). Many studies
focus on avowedly religious yet dispersed forms of translocal diasporic networks,
such as those embodied in Sufi brotherhoods (Werbner 1999, 2004) or global
movements of Islamic reform and purification (Mandaville 2004; Metcalf
1999). Others theorize about the ways in which the circulation of long-distance
traders, pilgrims, and holy men of religious authority all contribute to a shared
sense of Muslim community and the making of transcultural Islamic spaces or
ecumenes (Ho 2006, 100). Much of this work focuses on “coastal Muslims”
living in the expansive Indian Ocean region and argues that transregional ways
of being Muslim in such littoral spaces have been long overshadowed by works
that explore Muslim life in the so-called heartland of Islamic textual in northern
India (Didier and Simpson 2005, 43).3
In Chitral, too, connective ties of kin, trade, and religious knowledge are all
central to the making of transregional forms of Muslim collective identity that
challenge conventional core–periphery models of the sacred geography of
Asian Islam.4 This article adds to these studies by exploring the ways in which
3For comparative studies of other transregional spaces that cut across more conventional represen-
tations of cultural “areas,” see Bruce Grant (2005), Engseng Ho (2002, 2004, 2006), Seteney Shami
(2000), Edward Simpson (2006), and Willem van Schendel (2002a). See Benjamin F. Soares (2005)
and Robert Launay (1992) for considerations of transregional Muslim identities in West Africa.
4By focusing on an expansive mountain range that cross-cuts nation-states, is connected by net-
works of overland trade routes, and is made up of doctrinally and linguistically diverse valley com-
munities, I aim to show that mountain as well as coastal regions afford complex opportunities for
the instantiation of forms of sociality that are highly attuned to the negotiation of religious plurality.
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such forms of interconnectivity have interacted with another very different type
of transnational mobility: refugee flows generated by violence, Afghanistan’s frag-
mentation, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Pakistan’s North-West Frontier
Province has been profoundly affected by political instability, military conflict,
and displacement over the past three decades, making it an especially rich
setting for the study of transnational dynamics of Muslim self-understanding.
Most anthropological work on “refugees” in Pakistan focuses on “displaced
persons” living in “camps” (Shahrani 1995).5 “Uprooted” Afghans living a life
divided between camps and the frontier’s reformist Deobandi madrasas are
widely recognized as playing a critical role in the emergence of de-territorialized
forms of “Muslim identity,” the displacement of older identity registers, and the
so-called radicalization of Frontier Muslim identities (notably Kepel 2002; Roy
2004; see also Roy 1994; Roy and Zahab 2004). There is now a growing appreci-
ation of the diversity of the Afghan refugee experience in Pakistan (Monsutti
2006). The implications of this diversity, however, for the tenor of religious and
cultural life in Pakistan has remained largely unexplored.6
Thus, this article emphasizes the ways in which people’s older experiences of
mobility in a culturally complex world shape their current experiences of transre-
gional movement (Shami 2000, 189). Chitralis talked about and interacted with
men from Tajikistan and Afghanistan who lived and worked in their village in
diverse and complex ways. These incomers were not simply treated as rootless
“refugees” but as relatives, friends, and named persons who carried languages,
cultural practices, and unique forms of religious knowledge, as well as workers
and servants with shared histories of participation in culturally connected
realms of labor.
SULTON’S STORY
Sulton came to Chitral from the southern Gorno-Badakshan region of Tajiki-
stan in December 1999, two years after the cessation of full-scale military conflict
there but during a period of great economic hardship and political uncertainty.
5On camp-based refugees in Pakistan, see M. Nazif Shahrani (1995); cf. Michael Hutt (2005) on
Bhutan’s refugee community in Nepal. For a notable exception, see David B. Edwards (1990,
1994). My work differs from Edwards’s work on Pakistan-based Afghan refugees in Pakistan in
that I focus on the interactions between Afghan refugees and Pakistani Muslims in a local setting.
6There is an expanding body of literature by development-focused researchers based in Afghanistan
(e.g., Abbasi-Shavazi and Glazebook 2006; Collective for Social Science Research 2006a, 2006b;
Habibi and Hunt 2006; Stigter 2005), as well as more analytical treatments of the problems associ-
ated with the “repatriation” of Afghan refugees to the country today (Turton and Marsden 2002;
Monsutti 2006). The focus of these studies, however, is concerned more with the livelihood strat-
egies of refugees than with the implications that such forms of mobility have for understanding the
interconnected cultural and religious dynamics of life in Afghanistan and neighboring countries
today.
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His mother tongue is an Iranian-Pamiri language, Shughni, but he also speaks
Tajiki Farsi, Russian, and now Khowar and Dari (Afghan Farsi). On his arrival
in Chitral, a member of the family with whom I stay found him on a cold
winter’s night outside one of the village’s places of Ismai’li worship. Like the
Khowar-speaking Chitrali family with whom we both stayed, Sulton is a Shi’a
Ismai’li Muslim. During his first months in Chitral, Sulton frequently told the
family, themselves descendents of influential pirs (spiritual authorities), that it
was his search for Ismai’li religious knowledge that had motivated him to
embark on his journey to Chitral: Ismai’lis in Tajikistan, he said, had little knowl-
edge about Ismai’li doctrine as a result of the antireligion policies of the Soviet
Union, and he wanted to return home with a certificate of Ismai’li education.
Sulton’s stay in Chitral would not result in him acquiring any abstract sense of
affiliation with a shared Ismai’li communal identity, however. Sulton spent most
of his days collecting water, threshing wheat, chopping wood, and even planting
roses; yet his is stay in the village was eventful. He was known as “hot headed” by
the villagers. On one occasion, for instance, he gave a village boy, Aftab, who had
a reputation for being something of a loafer—a result of his public attempts to
meet girls and his fondness for shamelessly smoking hashish in the village
lanes—a sound beating over a disagreement concerning the division of the vil-
lage’s scant water supplies. Sulton also fell out with the Ismai’li family with
whom he stayed: He accused them of putting him to work but teaching him
nothing about religion. One evening, he fought with the family’s younger
brother, saying, “I have come to Pakistan to go back with something and not to
be treated like your slave.” He left the home, now pursued also by the village
police, who were threatening to charge him with assault, and never returned.
On September 8, 2001, I met Sulton again, this time on the polo ground at
the region’s administrative headquarters, Markaz. Sulton had radically trans-
formed his personal appearance: When first in Chitral, like most other men
from Tajikistan, he had worn Western-style trousers and had been clean
shaven; now, he appeared bearded and dressed in shalwar kamiz. He also
pointed in the direction of the group of men who had accompanied him to the
ground. Bearded and donning black turbans, they were, he told me, Afghan
Taliban based in the city of Jalalabad; he had been working for them as a
driver since leaving Chitral the previous year.
If Sulton had not embraced any abstract commitment to Ismai’li religious
knowledge or community during his stay in Chitral, neither had he been unthink-
ingly Talibanized by his experiences in Afghanistan either. Sitting underneath the
cool shade of the famous Chinese Plane tree where Chitrali polo players rest their
horses at halftime, Sulton whispered to me that he had not become a Sunni, nor
had he renounced his Ismai’li faith. Rather, in the company of his newly found
Taliban companions, he merely pretended to be a Sunni. “They don’t know
I’m an Ismai’li, don’t tell them,” he told me. The dissimulation (taqiya) of adher-
ence to Ismai’li doctrine and practice is a marked feature of historical and
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present-day Ismai’li experience. What is distinctive about Sulton’s case, however,
is that it involved an Ismai’li from Tajikistan joining the Taliban, a Sunni and
predominantly ethnically Pashtun movement, widely known for its deeply
hostile and violent attitudes to Shi’a Muslims. Pretending to be a hard-line
Sunni in such an ambient is not a simple task, especially for a post-Soviet
Ismai’li. Sunni and Shi’a Ismai’lis pray in very different ways, and Sulton told
me that he stood at the back of gatherings and imitated his Taliban bosses as
best he could. I noticed these men leaning on their plush new Toyota Hilux,
gazing at Sulton and myself chatting, and decided that this was not the place
to linger. Instead, I returned to the polo ground and watched the equally
captivating spectacle of the game between the Chitral Police and the Chitral
Scouts descending into a physical brawl involving players and their uniformed
supporters alike, an event that would lead to curfew being imposed in the
town the following day.
After September 11, I lost touch with Sulton but often wondered what had
happened to him. In March 2002, I was informed that Sulton had returned to
Chitral. He was now said to be working in the house of a man from a one-time
noble (adamzada) background, known as a lord (lal) across the region, and
who owned, by Chitrali standards, a substantial amount of land in a relatively
remote village to the north of the region. This lal was a Sunni, although he
was also known throughout Chitral for expressing near blasphemous statements.
He also had a well-earned reputation for being Chitral’s most prolific hashish pro-
ducer, and it was now rumored that he was diversifying his smuggling activities
into apricot schnapps—the production of which my former Talib friend,
Sulton, was said to be investing his talents, to great effect.
The next time I met Sulton was with the aforementioned lord on a snowy
afternoon in December 2005. We arranged to meet at dusk on the polo
ground, where Sulton told me that he felt he was now the proverbial “prisoner
of the mountains” (zomo qaidi): If he returned to Tajikistan, he would almost cer-
tainly be arrested by Tajikistan’s security forces, who were suspicious of all people
who had fled to Pakistan or Afghanistan during the civil war, and even more
suspicious of those who had yet to return. If he traveled to “down Pakistan”
(aff Pakistan) in order to meet officials at Tajikistan’s embassy, he feared that
he would picked up by the Pakistan police, perhaps sent to Guantánamo Bay,
or even deported to Tajikistan, where he risked standing accused of illegally
leaving his country during the civil war and being harshly treated by its police
and intelligence agencies. Sulton then pulled out a bottle of apricot schnapps
that he had hidden down his trouser leg and presented it to me as a gift
before bidding farewell.
On the one hand, Sulton’s story highlights the very different ways in which
states are directly involved in the production and regulation of transregional mobi-
lity. Sulton’s mobility is pervaded by a sense of surveillance by the nation-states
through which he travels, and this is often manifested in a fear of their intelligence
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agencies. Moreover, Sulton also recognizes the ways in which very different forms
of transnational policing and surveillance—those arising from the United States
and the so-called war on terror—add a further layer of complexity to the conse-
quences of his transregional mobility. In spite of such limits, however, more
neutral places, notably Chitral, continue to afford him complex opportunities
for repeating cycles of arrival, departure, and return. At the same time, Sulton
illustrates the importance of types of everyday strategies that anthropologists
have long recognized as being characteristic of life in borderlands. He is not
merely a nameless refugee, passively buffeted by distant international events
but rather embarks on complex courses of action in response to rapidly changing
geopolitical circumstances.
Sulton’s trickster-like ability to artfully instrumentalize the relationships he
builds with Chitrali Ismai’lis, Sunni smugglers, and the Pukhtun Taliban is an
important reminder of the social and moral multidimensionality that borderland
life may inject into even the most apparently bounded forms of collective identity.
Thus, Sulton persuasively switches between different registers of Muslim subjec-
tivity as he moves through the region. Ho has described the history of the Yemeni
Hadrami diaspora in relationship to a “landscape of places that closed or opened”
to different categories of people in relationship to “internal divisions” and “exter-
nal rivalries” (Ho 2006, 314). Sulton’s Chitral odyssey illustrates exactly the type
of work deployed by people who move through such shifting moral landscapes,
which are divided by colonially imposed boundaries and invested with shifting
forms of global political significance. A wily frontier strategist and a sophisticated
mountain cosmopolitan, Sulton affords us a unique glimpse into the making and
working of actual cosmopolitanism on the Pakistan–Afghan frontier.
THE SETTING
A region known today primarily because of the ongoing search for al-Qaeda
militants, the war on terror, and heroin cultivation, few appreciate the degree to
which northern Pakistan, northeast Afghanistan, and southern Tajikistan form an
interconnected region of the Muslim world that is remarkably diverse in relation
to its size and sparsely populated terrain.7 This section explores the ways in which
all these societies are historically connected and the importance of these for
understanding the region today.
I was aware throughout my fieldwork in Chitral that Chitrali Muslims have a
strong sense of identification with a broad transnational region that is similar in
important ways to what historians of precolonial India describe as a “Persianate”
realm. Historians conceptualize this Persianate realm as defined not only by the
7A notable exception is Hermann Kreutzmann’s (2003) sophisticated exploration of the changing
economic and political fortunes of the region’s high mountain farmers and pastoralists.
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importance of Persian as a language of political authority and high culture
but also in relationship to its shared literary traditions (Cole 2002; Mir 2006).
The Persianate world was not a homogenous, static, or territorially bounded
cultural entity. It was defined, rather, by ongoing cultural interchange between
India and Iran (Cole 2002) and with Turkic-speaking regions of Central Asia
(Canfield 1991). These complex processes of exchange led to the creation of
important “hierarchies of culture” (Alam and Subrahmanyam 2007, 177) within
and across a region that incorporated both Indian urban centers, notably
Delhi and Lucknow, as well as rural regions of Central Asia (Shahrani 1991).
Nevertheless, Persianate societies shared similar types of political authority
defined by a marked focus on kingship, distinctions between commoners and
aristocrats, and a courtly, literate, bureaucratic tradition (Alam 2004; Alam and
Subrahmanyam 2004).
Persianate forms of sociality, governance, and high culture formed a critical
dimension of everyday life in the expansive region on which I focus here.
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, each of these regions was once a
quasi-monarchical state, or princely kingdom incorporated into a central Asian
khanate.8 The fiefdoms of Gorno-Badakshan of present-day Tajikistan were,
until the expansion of the Soviet Union, embedded within tributary relationships
with the emirate of Bukhara (see Becker 1968). The kingdom of Afghan Badak-
shan was enmeshed in a shifting relationship with the centralizing Afghan state
(Noelle 1997), while the territorial boundaries of the Chitral princely kingdom,
which was part of both tributary and conflictual relations with the “states” of
Badakshan and Kashmir, constantly shifted in relationship to the factional succes-
sion disputes within the region’s “ruling family” (Biddulph 1972; IUCN Pakistan
2004).
The ruling families of many of these realms enjoyed a very high degree of
shared kinship with one another. At the same time, it was also a region of
intense instability provoked by ongoing factional struggles within and between
the region’s “states,” where the flight and exile of rulers and princely contenders
to courtly power was a widely deployed political strategy (Parkes 2001a).9 These
migrations also included the carriers of Persianate linguistic and cultural prac-
tices, including poets from the court of Kabul who “wrote the history of
Chitral in Persian poetry,” composed praise poetry in honor of its Mehtar, or
ruler, and taught the court’s children Persian (Murtaza 1982, 319).
8These mountain kingdoms also existed on the frontiers of the Mughal Empire, and, as with other
dry zones in Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, have long been intimately connected with the
history of India (see Gommans 2002). For an overview of Chitral’s historiography, see Wolfgang
Holzwarth (1996).
9The realm as a whole may be compared to Stanley J. Tambiah’s (1976) model of Southeast Asian
“galactic polities.” Court histories of Chitral document the crisscrossing migration of men and their
families descended from the ruling families of neighboring states, especially Badakshan (Murtaza
1982, 302; see also Kreutzmann 2003, 220).
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This political interconnectivity was further enhanced by flows of people
between these polities before and shortly after the expansion of Russian and
British colonial power in the region.10 Population movement included traders
and pilgrims en route to Mecca from Chinese Turkestan (Shahrani 2002, 41).
Complex systems of patronage that incorporated quasi-aristocratic gentry elites
and folk described as “serfs” (chirmuzh) and “servants” (khidmatgaran), in
Khowar and tenants (dehqan) in Dari were central to the region’s political
economy. Such people often moved with the region’s interrelated lordly elite
whom they served (Staley 1982). The transfer of “slaves,” moreover, between
these mountain realms (Hopkins, forthcoming), is another shared dimension of
past experience for the region’s people, the legacy of which continues to be a sen-
sitive topic of debate today.
In what ways have the cultural forms of this courtly Persianate been re-
formed within the context of South Asia’s modern nation-states? (Ali 2004, 3;
Parkes 2001b; Staley 1982, 153–54). Many scholars have argued that the divisive
effects of colonialism and nationalism obscured the range of ties that had once
connected this diverse Indo-Persian realm (Cole 2002, 31). Others suggest that
premodern Persianate traditions have been stripped of their vitality and rendered
an apolitical part of South and Central Asia’s “national cultures.” Yet despite now
being a fully integrated part of the Pakistan nation-state, many Chitrali Muslims
continue to speak and read Farsi. There is a very strong tradition in Chitral of the
performance of Khowar love songs, which are deeply influenced by Persianate
ghazal poetry. In recent years, moreover, many Chitralis have told me that the
region’s poets are using more and more complex Farsi words and phrases in
their writing. Much social science literature on Pakistan focuses on the Punjabi-
zation of the country’s cultural and political life (Jaffrelot 2002). Yet Chitralis talk
about processes that could be described as the Farsization of their popular
culture. Chitralis who speak Farsi, moreover, are not confined to elderly and
noble men educated during the final days of the Chitral court—younger men
from a wide range of backgrounds have also often learned Dari, most notably
from Chitral’s Afghan refugees.11 At the same time, the region’s ulama, or
dashmanan, continue to talk about the ability to read religious texts, especially
Rumi and Hafiz, in Farsi as a sign of great erudition and a source of unique
spiritual insight, despite their own education in reform-minded Urdu and
10The Norwegian linguist Georg Morgenstierne (1932, 68) said that he had met a man from Yamg,
an Ismai’li village that is now a part of Tajikistan, in the Chitral bazaar in 1929, pointing toward the
continuing interactions between Chitralis and Pamiri Ismai’lis living in the Soviet Union.
11Chitralis are conscious of the differences between the types of Farsi spoken in Afghanistan, Tajiki-
stan, and Iran and are also aware of the national linguistic categories “Dari” and “Tajiki.” On the
whole, however, they say that they are able to speak and read “Farsi”—this is why I refer to
Persian, Farsi, Tajiki, and Dari interchangeably throughout this article. On the complexities of
the scholarly usage of the terms “Persian,” “Farsi,” “Dari,” and “Tajik,” see Brian Spooner (1993).
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Pashto-medium madrasas that teach the Islamic sciences above all through the
use of Arabic texts.
Almost all Chitralis, moreover, say that Farsi is the “sweetest” language of all
and proudly comment that Khowar is more closely related to Farsi than the
North-West Frontier Province’s de facto language of politics and religion,
Pashto. What Chitralis themselves talk about as the expanding significance of
Farsi in their region’s popular culture has taken place alongside Chitral’s political
incorporation into the North-West Frontier’s political culture over the past thirty
years. During this period, Pakistan’s so-called Islamist political parties, the leader-
ship of which is predominantly Pukhtun (Nasr 2005), have become a central
feature of political life in Chitral. Much of the imaginative work that Chitralis
invest in mapping their region as a space influenced by high forms of Persian
culture and language, thus, forms a complex local response to the interplay
between Islamist and Pukhtun ethnic politics that has shaped many of the politi-
cal debates in the frontier in recent years.
Yet playing an active role in making and being a part of this extranational cul-
tural space does not simply eclipse the power of more vernacular-like forms of
self-understanding rooted in adherence to the diverse and cross-cutting registers
of locality, language, and doctrine. For all Rowshan villagers, “being Chitrali” and
speaking Khowar are critical reference points that distinguish them from other
ethnolinguistic groups in Pakistan and beyond, most especially Pashto-speaking
“Pukhtuns.” Furthermore, the invisible histories of movement I explore did
not take place between a Khowar-speaking Chitral realm, on the one hand,
and a generalized Persian-speaking realm, on the other. Diverse registers of lin-
guistic difference and attachment to locality were and remain an active feature of
life in the region. Major languages spoken, in addition to the notionally “national”
languages of Urdu, Dari, and Tajiki, include a range of Indo-Iranian languages
that are, although to widely differing degrees, closely related; these include
Khowar, Shughnani, Kalasha, Wakhi, Rowshani, and Yidgah (see Decker 1992;
Morgenstierne 1932; Staley 1982).
Nor does Islam define a religious continuum in the region in any simple
sense. Two types of Islamic doctrinal traditions are represented in the region:
Sunni and Shi’a Ismai’li. Ismai’lis are taught to believe the Aga Khan is the
“living Imam,” the closest direct descendent of Muhammad and therefore a
man of unique spiritual insight and power—he is also referred to as the
“talking Qur’an,” or qur’an-e natiq (Daftary 1990).12 The village people with
12Shi’a Ismai’lis came into being as a result of a schism over succession to the imamate in 1094, and
Ismai’lis differentiate themselves from Ithna ‘ashariyya Shi’a Muslims. There have also been a
number of doctrinal splits during the course of Ismai’li history (Daftary 1998, 2). The Nizari Ismai’-
lis are the largest Ismai’li doctrinal cluster. The other Ismai’li community in South Asia is the Tayyibi
Ismai’lis, known as the Bohras (see Engineer 1989; Blank 2001). Ismai’lis in Chitral and, indeed,
northern Pakistan, are all Nizari Ismai’lis. In Chitral, Shi’a Ismai’lis contrast their modes of theolo-
gical understanding and experience with those of the region’s Sunnis. At one level, what
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whom I work are all Khowar-speaking Muslims, yet they categorize themselves as
being either Shi’a Ismai’li or Sunni. There have been moments of violent conflict
between the followers of these deeply divergent Islamic “doctrinal clusters,” both
during the colonial period, notably in 1924, and in more recent years in 1982,
1999, and 2001 (see Marsden 2005).
Although Islam divides as much as it unites the region’s Muslims, the Ismai’li
Islamic tradition is an important and shared source of faith, self-understanding,
and experience, as well as conflict, in all of these settings. Ismai’lis in the
region talk a great deal about their collective memories and experiences of
“cruelty” (zulm) in the Sunni-majority courtly and latterly nation-states within
which they live. In recent years, Ismai’lis in Afghanistan have faced violent
attacks by the Sunni mujahidin (see Ehmadi 1993, 1998), which led many of
them to flee to Chitral, especially between 1992 and 2001.13 In Chitral, too,
powerful Sunni religious authorities trained in Pakistan’s religious seminaries
campaigned throughout the 1990s for the Pakistan state to declare Ismai’lis
non-Muslim infidels (kafiran) (Marsden 2005). In 1999, it was widely rumored
among Chitrali Muslims that the Aga Khan was considering evacuating all of
Chitral’s Ismai’lis to Canada in the event of a major upsurge in violent sectarian
conflict in the region. Shared experiences and the imagination of flight, thus, are
marked features of the collective memory of Shi’a Ismai’lis across all of these
diversely constituted realms.
Neither the shared historical memory of Sunni cruelty nor the more recent
interactions between Afghan and Chitrali Ismai’lis have resulted in the creation
of an elevated sense of Ismai’li internal sameness, however.14 Ismai’li religious
distinguishes them from Chitral Sunnis is that they are taught to believe that the Aga Khan or
“Present Iman” is the center of Shi’a Ismai’li belief and cosmology, imbued with a special form
of spiritual insight and power, and considered to be able to interpret the Qur’an in a way that is
impossible for ordinary Muslims. At the same time, they also emphasize the ways in which the
Shi’a Ismai’li tradition of Islam focuses particularly on the need to understand the inner (batin)
meanings of the Qur’an. Ismai’li Qur’anic interpretation (tafsir) emphasizes the importance of eso-
teric hermeneutics (ta’wil) in which the surface words of the Qur’an are understood as having a
deeper meaning than the doctrines they elicit. In contrast, the region’s Sunnis are often said to
be above all concerned with “surface level” (tanzil) forms of Qur’anic interpretation (tafsir). The
historiography of Shi’a Ismai’lis forms of knowledge, identity, and devotion in Chitral remains con-
tested, although some authors suggest Ismai’li forms of thought and identity may have been import-
ant in the region from the early seventeenth century (Holzwarth 1996, 123).
13On the Afghan Badakshan’s mujahidin and their role in the anti-Soviet resistance movement, see
Shahrani (1984).
14The influences of transnational forces on Ismai’li ways of being Muslim in Chitral today are
complex and often have a more apparently “global” dimension . The Aga Khan is a U.K. citizen
based in Paris, while the offices of the Aga Khan Foundation (a major international nongovernmen-
tal organization) are located in Geneva. Both of these places form an important part of the religious
and geographic horizons of the region’s Ismai’li Muslims. The Aga Khan makes relatively frequent
visits to Chitral (most recently in December 2003) and other regions of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and
Afghanistan with significant Ismai’li populations (see Marsden 2005 for a consideration
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self-understandings, as I have encountered them, are always relationally defined.
Interactions among Afghan, Chitrali, and Tajik Ismai’lis, emerging from the por-
ousness of the region’s boundaries over the past decade, have contributed to a
growing emphasis on Ismai’li internal sameness. Yet, as I will discuss later, this
has not inevitably weakened other types of attachment to locality and regional
custom. Nor has it created a miniature Ismai’li arch within a broader and
rapidly emerging Shi’a crescent, which, according to political scientists such as
Vali Nasr (2006), links politically resurgent Shi’a Muslims from Beirut to
Lucknow. Rather, the region’s Ismai’lis often talk about the cultural differences
that distinguish them from one another, but they unite in relationship to
Ismai’li communities elsewhere in South Asia, notably Gujerati-speaking Khoja
Ismai’lis, who are influential in the offices and institutions of the Aga Khan.15
Abstract types of Islamic consciousness are not innate and just waiting to be rea-
lized—rather, different types of Muslim self-understanding remain simul-
taneously important without simply effacing one another.
If modern refugee flows have not simply led to the displacement of regionally
distinctive registers of Muslim self-understanding, then neither have they effaced
older forms of interregional connectivity. The influx of men from the post-Soviet
state of Tajikistan in the late 1990s, in addition to Sunni and Ismai’li Muslims
from Afghanistan, adds another layer of complexity to the transregional connec-
tions that I am currently exploring.16 Chitral became a unique and interactive
space that connects the predominantly Muslim societies of postcolonial Pakistan,
post-Soviet Tajikistan, as well as “semicolonial” Afghanistan (Goodman 2000;
Shih 1996). People whose lives had been divided for nearly a century once
again shared the intimate spaces of Chitrali villages.17 In October 2005,
of deedar). During the Aga Khan’s visit in December 2003, for example, the family of Chitrali
Ismai’lis with whom I stay hosted Ismai’li guests from both Tajikistan and Iran.
15Ismai’lis in Badakshan and Chitral, however, explain the origin of these differences that divide
them from their Khoja brethren as being a product of their affiliation to an Ismai’li spiritual tra-
dition said to be a legacy of the preaching activities of the eleventh-century mystical poet
Nasir-e Khusraw (Hunsberger 2000). A complex funeral ritual, the chiragh-e roshan, widely
said by Ismai’lis throughout the region to be a direct legacy of the preaching activities of Nasir-e
Khusraw, is one especially important diacritical mark deployed the region’s mountain Ismai’lis to
define themselves in relation to their co-religionists in different settings within and beyond
South Asia. Cf. John R. Bowen (1989) for the ways in which Muslims in Sumatra distinguish them-
selves on the basis of distinctions they make between different modes of performing Islamic daily
prayers.
16For detailed accounts of Tajikistan’s civil war, see especially Shirin Akiner (2002), Shirin Akiner,
Mohammad-Reza Djalili, and Frederic Grare (1997), and Adeeb Khalid (2007, 148–53). For a
recent study of the textual expressions of the Ismai’li Islamic tradition in the Pamirs during the
late nineteenth century, see Abdul Iloliev (2006).
17The villages and small towns of the Gorno-Badakshan Oblast did not see major fighting, yet they
were subjected to a blockade by Tajik government forces. Pamiri Tajiks, the term widely used to
refer to Ismai’lis living in Badakshan, were involved in the civil war. Some Pamiris fought and
became especially commanders for the opposition Islamic Movement for Tajikistan (Roy and
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I visited villages in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan Oblast in order to meet Pamiris,
the term widely used by the region’s people to refer to the Ismai’lis who live in the
high mountain villages of both Tajikistan and Afghanistan and who lived in Chitral
between 1992 and 1999 as refugees. I was told how they had swum across the
Pyanj River into Afghanistan, where they bartered with Afghan Wakhi-speaking
villagers for kerosene and aluminum dishes in return for precious Afghan
supplies of oil, rice, but also tea from Chitral.18 In small groups, they also tra-
versed the AfghanWakhan corridor and the high passes of the Hindu Kush, even-
tually reaching Chitrali villages after a three-day walk. Chitral occupied an
important place in the geographic and imaginative horizons of all the Pamiris
I spoke to. Village elders remember their grandfathers walking to Chitral in
order to procure teas, sugar, and salt before their region’s incorporation into
the Soviet Union. Others told me that their grandmothers were Chitrali, and
they could remember the names of the Chitrali villages from where they had
come and asked me if I had visited these places. One man even remembered
some of the Khowar words that he had been taught by his grandmother as a
child. Thus, Tajik men did not simply enter Chitral as displaced persons; they
arrived, rather, with previously existing reputations and holding historically
informed expectations of the nature of Chitrali life.
Connections between these regions, however, have changed rapidly in
relationship to changing geopolitical circumstances. After the American-led
defeat of the Taliban government in Kabul in 2002, the Chitral–Afghan border
was effectively sealed. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the government of Pakistan also actively pursued initiatives
designed to encourage the return of Pakistan-based Afghan refugees to their
country. These included the closure of established refugee camps in Pakistan,
the relocation of Afghan refugees living in urban settings such as Peshawar to
more remote and rural locations elsewhere in the frontier, and the offering
of financial incentives by the UNHCR designed to encourage the return of
Afghans to Afghanistan. At one level, these changing representations of
Afghans living in Pakistan from internationally recognized refugees to non-
refugees stand in contrast to the ways in which the subjectivities and roles
Zahab 2004) against progovernment forces. As a result, Pamiri Tajiks living in Dushanbe were the
targets of widespread violent attacks. Consequently, many Dushanbe-based Pamiris sought to
escape to their ancestral villages in the Pamirs during the war. Yet the people of Gorno-Badakshan,
a region that had hitherto largely depended on Soviet subsidies, were starving as a result of the gov-
ernment blockade of traffic to the region, including humanitarian aid convoys. It was during these
years that hundreds of ethnic “Pamiris” from post-Soviet Tajikistan migrated as seasonal laborers
and refugees to the villages of Chitral and Pakistan’s major cities, especially Karachi, which is
also home to a wealthy and vibrant Ismai’li community.
18These modern-day forms of “barter” thus invoked older memories of transregional trade in the
era before the hardening of the colonial boundaries that divided British India from the Soviet
Union (Shahrani 2002).
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of Afghan refugees are understood in complex and multidimensional ways in
specific localities in Pakistan. At the same time, they point toward the ways in
which nation-states and international organizations have increasingly represented
refugees and formulated their policies in relationship to attempts by United
States in order to assert a claim of stability in Afghanistan in the wake of the coun-
try’s invasion in 2001 (Turton and Marsden 2002, 3).
These changes have had important consequences for the livelihoods and per-
sonal experiences of the region’s mobile mountain Muslims. Since December
2001, few Farsi-speaking Afghan and Tajik peoples have been able to enter
Chitral without either Afghan refugee cards or Pakistani visas and internationally
valid passports. Some Afghan refugees with legal documentation stayed, but most
left. Importantly, many of those who did leave continue to hold Afghan refugee
cards; they continue to make frequent returns to Chitral in order to participate in
education courses run by small-scale private tuition centers (especially English
language and computer training), sell cheap secondhand cars from Afghanistan
at higher Pakistan prices, and visit the Chitrali families with whom they lived
during the previous thirty years.19 Others who remained in the region without
proper documentation, as in the case of Sulton, now lived in a region of uncer-
tainty, surrounded by heavily policed boundaries and thrust into the international
spotlight after September 11.
The closure of the Afghan–Pakistan border had a profound impact on
people’s everyday lives. The region’s interconnected frontier economy underwent
rapid change: Cross-border trade in meat and precious stones, especially lapis
lazuli and polo horses from Afghanistan, and kerosene and wheat from Chitral,
abruptly ceased. Afghan villagers in Badakshan told me they could neither
walk to Chitral nor afford the expensive journey to Kabul. By July 2003, the
only Afghans living permanently in Chitral were Sunnis who owned butcher
shops and bakeries; many Chitrali shopkeepers complained that the bazaar felt
“empty” (khali).
Yet connections between the regions have an uncanny ability to reappear even
after the imposition of apparently rigid forms of boundaries: The borders that
divide the region’s people open as they close. International development nongo-
vernmental organizations, especially the Aga Khan Development Network, have
been active in Chitral since 1983 (Parkes 2000); they are now undergoing signifi-
cant downsizing in Pakistan but are expanding their operations in the postconflict
19Most “Chitrali Afghans,” as they often refer to themselves, have now returned to their country,
and the assisted repatriation of Afghans living in Chitral by the UNHCR continued during a visit
to the North-West Frontier Province in August 2006. In Kabul, I have met men working in the
city’s burgeoning guesthouse sector who lived and worked in Rowshan and spoke to me in
Khowar. Many other Afghan refugees who ran shops in Chitral’s main bazaars, have now opened
businesses in Afghanistan’s major cities, notably Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul, and Kunduz. Chitrali devel-
opment professionals working in Afghanistan also talk of the affectionate friendships they have built
with Khowar-speaking Afghan men whom they knew as refugees in Chitral.
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settings of Tajikistan andAfghanistan. Their one-timeChitrali employees are often
attracted by the prospect of handsome U.S. dollar salaries to work in Afghanistan:
well educated, and having been brought up with Afghans and speaking fluent
Dari, Chitrali men are especially attractive candidates for these posts, and many
now live and work in Kabul and Badakshan.20
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: FIGHTER PILOTS, RED ARMY SOLDIERS, AND DUSHANBE
ARTISTS
The remainder of this article will focus on the everyday negotiation of diversity
in my main Chitral fieldwork site, Rowshan. Rowshan is a large and relatively pros-
perous village with a population of about 8,000 largely Khowar-speaking Ismai’li
and Sunni Muslims. These people are mostly long-term Rowshan dwellers, but
they also include more recent “incomers” from nearby villages that are less
wealthy than Rowshan. Almost all Rowshan villagers own relatively small landhold-
ings on which they grow subsistence crops of rice, wheat, and vegetables. There is
also an expanding “new elite” of well-educated villagers employed by nongovern-
mental organizations and government offices within and beyond the region.
In what follows, I will focus on the forms taken by interactions between inco-
mers and Rowshan people. Rowshan villagers referred to Afghans and Tajiks in
their village as “outside people” (berieo roye) and “strangers” (nagoni). Many
social scientists continue to depict refugees as rootless people, devoid of a particu-
lar national culture and, as a result, excluded from the national imaginaries of the
countries in which they live. States and their publics consider them, in other words,
an impure threat to what Liisa H. Malkki (1995) has termed the globally hegemo-
nic “national order of things.” For Malkki, such folk have one of two options: They
must either create “nation-like” identities in order to forge for themselves a space
in the “national order of things,” or they must subvert it by emphasizing their
“liminality.” These arguments have been forcefully contested in recent years,
most notably by Aihwa Ong, who suggests that Malkki fails to explore the
“complex, ambiguous and interweaving processes that transform refugees back
into citizens,” noting that “particular states and their publics may be for and
against refugee influx at different points of time” (2003, 78–79).21
20The role played by the Aga Khan Foundation in cultivating a transcultural world is particularly
important. Many of the Chitralis currently employed in development posts in Afghanistan are
employed by the Aga Khan Foundation. At the same time, I have met women from Tajikistan’s
Badakshan region who have been sponsored by the Aga Khan Foundation to undergo courses in
health and education training in Chitral. Constraints of space prevent a detailed exploration of
the institutional dimensions of transregional space-making here.
21The problems with conceptualizing refugee movements without considering their relationship to
older forms of migration and mobility have also been challenged by refugee specialists working on
Afghan refugees in Pakistan (see Connor 1989).
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Despite their use of the term “outsider,” Rowshan people deploy a wide
range of categories to describe the men from Afghanistan and Tajikistan living
in their village. These diverse ways of imagining and categorizing refugees
have major implications for shaping the nature of the interactions that take
place between villagers and outside people and, therefore, Rowshan villagers’
cosmopolitan “appreciation of ideas, things, and beings from many places”
(Tsing 2006) in Rowshan.
Rowshan people’s conceptualizations of “outsiders” are characterized by
a very high degree of complexity (cf. de Munck 2005; Froerer 2006). There are
three major categories of “outsiders” (nagoni) that are relationally referred to
one another during everyday conversations between Rowshan villagers. First,
there are Khowar-speaking people who have settled in Rowshan since migrating
there from nearby villages. Second, there are people from “down Pakistan,”
especially Pashto-speaking Pukhtuns who live and work in the village, mostly as
hawkers and shopkeepers. Third, there are those people whom Rowshan villagers
describe as “doers of Farsi” ( farsi korak)—these are the Dari- and Tajik-speaking
refugees and laborers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan who are the central focus of
this article.
These different types of “outsiders” are placed within a moral hierarchy that
is known and understood by most Rowshan villagers. Villagers perceive different
categories of outsiders as capable of bringing strikingly contrasting forms of
immorality to village life. Pukhtuns are widely perceived as being the most
dangerous type of stranger: They are associated with many types of criminality,
notably theft, child snatching, and drug smuggling.22 In comparison to Pukhtuns,
Rowshan villagers see Farsi-speaking “Tajiks” as less morally corrupting. Some
Farsi speakers live with their families in Rowshan, where they own respectable
businesses; many have lived in Chitral for up to thirty years and speak fluent
Khowar. The ability of these “refugees” to speak Khowar is something that villa-
gers contrast to what they perceive as the inability of Pukthuns to learn their civi-
lized and sophisticated language. Villagers often say that Khowar and Farsi are
closely related and both “sweet” (shireen) languages in a way that the “hard”
(sakht) Pashto is not.23
Rowshan villagers, however, do not simply essentialize all Afghan refugees as
“doers of Farsi” but also typify these folk on the basis of more finite distinctions.
They categorize most “doers of Farsi” as one of two types. First, the term “Tajik”
(tazhi) is widely used to refer to Farsi-speaking people from the Badakshan and
Panjshir regions of Afghanistan. These people are often blamed for introducing
22Depictions of Pukhtuns as child kidnappers are of particular historical significance in South Asia,
especially in urban settings such as Bombay, where “Pathans” also have a reputation for being
especially brutal moneylenders and strikebreakers (see Chandavarkar 1998, 173; Bhattacharya
2006).
23On Khowar’s interrelatedness to these regional languages, see Elena Bashir (1996), Rolf Thiel
Endressen and John Chr. Kristiansen (1981), and Morgenstierne (1936).
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homosexuality (bachabazi) into the region, although this discourse is more widely
articulated in Chitral’s urban district headquarters, Markaz, than it is in village
settings such as Rowshan.24 Second, Rowshan villagers deploy very different
stereotypes to talk about another category outsiders who are, nevertheless, also
said to be “doers of Farsi”: “Wakhiks” are Wakhi-speaking Ismai’li people who
have long migrated to Chitral largely as seasonal laborers (mazduran) from
the Wakhan corridor, a valley that forms a narrow strip of Afghan territory
between Pakistan and Afghanistan (see Kreutzmann 2003, 221).25 Wakhi is an
Pamiri Iranian language, but it is different in significant ways from other
languages spoken in Chitral and Badakshan. Wakhiks are said by Chitralis to
be harmless simpletons (nacharagan) who have “nothing in their head” (kaka
nikie). They are the upcountry hicks (sarhadi roye) against whom Rowshan villa-
gers often define themselves as cultured (tazhibyi haftah) city-dwellers (shaharo
roye).26 Chitralis also say, however, that they have lost many positive human qual-
ities during the course of their long struggle to attain their lofty status as fully rea-
lized humans (insanan), but the simple honesty (sadahgi) of their forefathers
remain clearly visible in the thinking and behavior of their Wakhik neighbors.
My Chitral friends spoke with the “doers of Farsi” in the village in Farsi,
although among themselves, the “outsiders” talked in a very wide range of
Pamiri Iranian languages, includingWakhi, Shughnani, Rushani, and Ishkashemi.
They lived mainly in groups of as many as ten men in cramped rooms in the vil-
lage’s small bazaar that they rented from Rowshan people. Some of them lived
alone or in pairs in village houses, where they also worked as agricultural laborers.
Rowshan’s bazaar, a largely deserted space after the evening prayers, was filled,
between 1995 and 2002, until late into the night with the sound of Tajik and
Afghan music played on petrol containers fashioned into a rabob, a type of
Afghan string instrument by Wakhiks and other “doers of Farsi” inside the
crowded rooms in the bazaar.
These “outsiders” did not, however, live lives confined to the small teahouses
(chai khana) and rented rooms of Rowshan’s dusty bazaar alone: Complex cul-
tural and religious transactions also took place between Chitralis and “outsiders.”
Persianate cultural forms were not simply a preexisting feature of Rowshan cul-
tural life—as a result of the interactions between villagers and outsiders, they also
24One reason for these differences in the perception of Afghan refugees may lie in the stricter ideas
concerning sexual morality among urban Markaz dwellers compared to the village setting of
Rowshan.
25About 50,000 Wakhi-speaking peoples live on both sides of the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border
along the Wakhan corridor, Pakistan’s northern areas (especially the upper zones of the Ishkoman
and Hunza valleys), northern Chitrali villages, and in the town of Tashkurgan in China’s Xinjiang
region (Kreutzmann 2003, 220). On the Wakhan, see Shahrani (2002); for an account of life in a
Wakhi community in northern Pakistan, see Sabine Felmy (1997). For a survey of Wakhi life strat-
egies across the region, see Kreutzmann (2003).
26For a comparative study of the importance of tropes concerning the differences between city folk
and upcountry hicks in Afghan storytelling, see Margaret A. Mills (1991).
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continually leaked into daily village experience and were rendered into a shared
focus of identification. The Afghan and Tajik guests (menu) were not treated
simply as demeaning household servants, lowly immigrants in need of patronizing
support, or amusing diversions from the monotony of daily village life. Rather,
some Tajik men quickly earned a reputation for being cultured and creative,
and many Rowshan villagers became close friends with the incoming “doers of
Farsi.” This was not as visible, however, in Chitralis’ interactions with Pukhtuns
traders and hawkers (alghani). The alghani were rarely, if ever, invited as
guests or friends into Chitrali homes. On a number of occasions indeed,
Pukhtun hawkers were forced to leave the village’s hamlets after having been
accused by Rowshan men of encouraging village women to waste their precious
resources on useless trinkets.
Rowshan villagers chatted with Farsi-speaking men, introduced me to them
as their friends, and even invited them into the intimate spaces of their family
homes. They were also seen as a critical intellectual resource: They taught
some villagers how to read Sufi books by Persian mystics such as Hafiz, Sa’di,
and Shiraz. A particular visible space where Persianate cultural forms could
clearly be seen leaking into village life was Rowshan’s bakery shop, opened by
refugees from Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley in 1998. Each afternoon, the shop
would be full of village boys who gathered to learn Dari and recite verses from
Farsi poems. One young Rowshan man in his early twenties, Zulfikar, generated
such a passion for the study of Farsi that he even chose to embark on a master’s
degree in Persian literature at Peshawar University. Importantly, he was also able
to persuade his parents of the worthiness of his subject by saying that he would
easily find well-paid employment with a nongovernmental organization working
with Afghan refugees in Peshawar. Afghans also contributed more widely to the
cultural life of Rowshan. Juma Khan, an Ismai’li man in his early twenties from
Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor who lived in Chitral between 1995 and 1997, fre-
quently relayed reports about Sunni mujahidin hostility toward Wakhik Ismai’lis
to his Chitrali friends. At the same time, during collective “Chitrali” evenings of
music and dance, villagers often persuaded him to perform Afghan and Wakhi
songs on his wooden flute.
Many men from Tajikistan earned reputations for being “artists.” They were
invited to paint the walls of Rowshan houses with mountain sceneries, depictions
of deer and peacocks, and portraits of the current Aga Khan, Prince Karim.27
These wall murals were a significant innovation to the decorative standards of
Rowshan homes. Hitherto, many Rowshan Ismai’lis had not even dared to
display photographs of the Aga Khan inside their guesthouses for fear of being
vilified as “idol worshippers” (bud parast) by Rowshan Sunnis, let alone paint
27There is also a convergence of both older traditions of Persianate miniature painting that were
historically important in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan region (Iloliev 2006) and newer forms of
Soviet-inspired “Tajik” national art forms.
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full-scale portraits of him on their walls. Young Rowshan Sunni men, undergoing
training in the Islamic sciences in Deobandi madrasas often say that the “kind
angels of paradise” will never enter a house in which images of the human
form are to be found. Wall paintings of the Aga Khan have the power to
invoke even stronger emotions; they furnish evidence that Ismai’lis commit
shirk, or associationism, by treating the Aga Khan as a kind of demigod.
Framed photographs of the Aga Khan are often found in Ismai’li households,
yet many Ismai’lis remove these from their guesthouses when they are expecting
Sunni visitors known to hold uncompromising attitudes toward both images and
Ismai’lis. This strategy of concealment, of course, is not applicable to wall
paintings, which, therefore, embody the expression of Ismai’li forms of self-
understanding in a shifting space located between the privacy of the home and
the public of the bazaar.
Conversations about life in Tajikistan and Afghanistan were common
between both Sunni and Ismai’li Rowshan villagers and Farsi-speaking outsiders.
In these, the assumptions held by many Rowshan villagers about the monolithic
“backwardness” (pasmandhagi) of Badakshan and its people were frequently
challenged by the graphic accounts given by Tajikistan’s “refugees” about life
in their region. Sitting in small groups in village orchards, we were often told
that Badakshan, like upper Chitral, was mountainous, remote, and populated
predominantly by Ismai’li Muslims.
Yet Chitralis also learned from Tajik men that across the River Pyanj, a very
different model of the Badakshani village was in place. In contrast to the stereo-
types widely held by Chitralis about “backward” (pasmandah) Wakhiks, villagers
in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan Oblast enjoyed electricity and metaled roads
that had been built by the Soviet government—such forms of “modernity” had
yet to penetrate Rowshan village life. My Chitrali friends also discovered that
the men now working as laborers in their fields had been engaged in very differ-
ent forms of employment before the Soviet Union’s breakdown. Rowshan’s
Tajikis told dramatic stories about how they had been parachuted as spies and
translators into Afghanistan by the Soviet army. Through such conversations,
Rowshan villagers gained insights into and made comparisons between the com-
plexity of the wider setting in which they lived and the diverse types of moderniz-
ing transformations its people had experienced over the past century. Through
these interactions, Rowshan people increasingly saw themselves as existing
within a transnational realm where vernacular identities existed alongside a
more expansive set of Persianate values, as well as the sometimes unifying and
at other times divisive bonds of religion.28
28It is important to note as well that such extranational forms of identity imaginings have thrived in a
broader national setting in which the Pakistan “state” has consistently sought to homogenize
national identity along both ethnic and religious lines (see Ali 2005; Jaffrelot 2002).
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THE CHIEF MINISTER IS COMING: PLEASE MOVE INSIDE!
Nation-states, international organizations, and older and newer imperial for-
mations have played and continue to play very different roles in the simultaneous
production and division of this transregional space. A study of interactions
between “refugees” and “local villagers” in Chitral would be incomplete, there-
fore, without a consideration of the role of “the state” in the regulation and sur-
veillance of this movement. What I have found useful for understanding the
production of actually existing forms of cosmopolitan practices in this geopoliti-
cally sensitive setting is that these are not merely the product of a contradiction
between a distant state acting (or failing to act) on a remote locality. Rather, local
“faces” of the “Pakistan state” are often themselves producers of complex forms
of transregional identity.
Rowshan is relatively remote, yet there are law courts, a police station, and
a deputy superintendent of police in the village. As has widely been noted, the
police are never a monolithic force instrumentally responsive to central
command but always firmly situated within particular social contexts (Chandavar-
kar 1998, 15). In Rowshan, I suggest, they did not merely imagine refugees as
dangerously destabilizing and polluting influences on the bounded certainties
of village life. Rather, new interactions that took place between the “state” and
the “refugees” did so in a space richly invested with the imprint of shared
forms of sociocultural values concerning the status of the refugees as guests,
co-religionists, friends, laborers, and the possessors of shared histories. This
played a critical role in shaping the interactions between the Chitrali faces of
the Pakistan state and the refugees.
The legal status of “outside people” was a source of confusion in the village.
In December 1995, for instance, the chief minister of Pakistan’s North-West
Frontier Province was planning a visit to Rowshan. Such a high-level state visit
to Chitral is relatively rare, and when such events do occur, they entail consider-
able levels of security and displays of protocol: A police escort accompanies the
chief minister everywhere he goes. Many Rowshan people told me that they were
worried that the police accompanying the chief minister would see the illegal
Tajiks and deport them. Unlike Rowshan’s several Afghan refugee families who
held identity cards, the men from Tajikistan were not able to secure legal docu-
mentation within Chitral and were often too frightened to make the long journey
to “Pakistan” in order to do so.
The men from Tajikistan were aware of their legally precarious position in
Rowshan. As a matter of routine, they avoided going to the region’s administra-
tive headquarters because they feared being detained by the Chitral police there.
One Wakhi-speaking man in his late forties whom I met in Tajikistan in October
2005 had worked and lived with a Seyyid family in Rowshan for five months.
During this period, he had only been to Markaz once, and even on that occasion,
he had been too scared to walk around the bazaar, for fear of being caught by the
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police; instead, he stayed put in the vehicle in which he traveled. There is also a
police station (thana) in Rowshan, yet this man and others told me that they did
not fear Rowshan’s police. Indeed, he told a gathering of neighbors in his village
in Tajikistan’s Wakhan corridor that on the day he had left Rowshan for Tajikistan,
not only had a village policeman helped him find a vehicle that was going to the
northern Afghan border, but also he told the driver that his passenger that day
was simple, poor, and going home with gifts for his family—under no circum-
stances, therefore, should he be asked for a fare.
Collaborations between Chitral’s police, villagers, and the incoming Tajiks
sometimes took a bigger and more significant form. One day before the chief
minister’s visit in December 1995, for example, Rowshan’s deputy superinten-
dent of police, at the time a bearded Sunni man from Markaz who could
usually be seen in the early evening fingering his prayer beads and sauntering
toward the mosque, drove his police vehicle around the village and publicly
announced on a loudspeaker that any people from Tajikistan staying in the
village who did not hold identity cards should not go to the bazaar but instead
stay with Rowshan families the following day. If not, they risked being deported
to their homes and also getting Chitral’s police into great trouble. Rowshan
people frequently invoke the great sacrifices (qurbani) they have made for
their Tajik brothers (brargini) and guests: “Chitrali hospitality,” thus, led both
to an open-endedness of individual subjectivity that promoted interactions with
Farsi-speaking outsiders, and it also allowed Chitralis to draw boundaries
around more exclusive forms of cultural “intimacy” (Herzfeld 1997, 47–48).
The collaborations that took place between Rowshan’s police force, villagers,
and refugees clearly challenge, in Ong’s words, any simple notion that refugees
and citizens are inevitably related to one another as “irreconcilable opposites”
(2003, 70). Refugees interact not with faceless states that exist outside local con-
texts but with institutions that are “deeply imbued” with “socio-cultural values”
(79) and, I suggest, embedded within particular historicosocial spaces. The
“state” is multiply constituted, and its faces engage with “refugees” through
different matrixes that include but are not defined by the logics of national
inclusion alone. These different and intensely local “faces of the state”
(Navaro-Yashin 2002) are clearly imbued with sociocultural values that both
provide the basis for the cosmopolitan appreciation and engagement with
people from very different backgrounds but also construct boundaries around
more vernacular forms of shared selfhood and community.
WE ARE NOT WAKHIK! TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM IDENTIFICATIONS
Far from provoking the emergence of de-cultural and avowedly religious forms
of Muslim identity, Rowshan’s refugees, I have argued, facilitated a range of
older and newer forms of cultural interchange and contributed to Chitral’s status
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as a transregional setting in which the everyday practice of coexistence with Afghan
and Tajik incomers is one important cosmopolitan dynamic. When Chitralis shared
their homes, engaged in conversations, and sought out these men as their friends,
they were interacting with people who, for example, had experiences of work and
education in the Soviet world. It would be misleading to think, however, that the
cosmopolitan appreciation for diversity that is a visible feature of Rowshan village
life only informs the lived nature of relationships between villagers and incomers,
and therefore is generated by an external impulse or even global force that has
instrumentally forged a break in the local subjectivity of Chitrali people. Rather,
many Chitralis are aware of their families’ own transregional pasts.29 So I will
now explore the role played by older and newer forms of transregional mobility
in the personal and family narratives of Chitralis today. My broader aim, though,
is not merely to contest the status of “the nation” in the identity imaginings of
the region’s people or to question its “naturalness” as a category of analysis
(Gupta 1992, 64; Van Schendel 2002b, 139). Rather, I ask in what ways people’s
older experiences of mobility in a culturally complex transregional space shape
their current experiences, understandings, and strategies of negotiation with
what today are transnational flows (Shami 2000, 189).
Rowshan villagers recognized that the flows of Afghan and Tajik people into
their village were a product of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disinte-
gration of the Afghan state. Yet these movements of people were also talked
about in terms of their relationship to older patterns of migration in the
region. Rowshan Chitralis often tell me that most of their region’s people are
the descendents of both Farsi- and Wakhi-speaking “Afghans.” They also have
an in-depth historical awareness about these migrations. One woman, now
aged in her early seventies, told me that her father, along with his wife and
two children, had fled the Wakhan corridor in order to avoid being forced to
join the Afghan army. Historians have documented, indeed, the social dislo-
cations caused by the attempts of successive Afghan emirs and leaders—
notably Abdur Rahman Khan—to weaken the authority of Badakshan nobility
and extend the authority of the “Afghan state” in the region (cf. Schomberg
1935, 268; Shahrani 2002).30 This woman’s parents and many other Wakhiks
29The Pakistan–Afghanistan border (known as the Durand line) was established in 1893, while the
Wakhan corridor (intended as a buffer zone between Russia and British India) was mapped in 1895.
For an account of the mapping of these borders, see Algernon Durand (2001). Political anxieties
about the porousness of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border have been a marked feature of relation-
ships between the two countries over the past fifty years. During the 1960s and 1970s, political ten-
sions between Afghanistan and Pakistan heightened as a result of fears by the Pakistan government
of the Afghan state’s role in the sponsoring of a movement for the creation of Pashunistan. These
issues remain important today: In 2007, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf claimed that he
intended to fence the Pakistan–Afghanistan border in order to prevent the incursion of Taliban
fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
30Norwegian linguistic scholar Georg Morgenstierne also documented the continuing influx of
Wakhiks into Chitral during his first visit to the region in 1929 (see Morgenstierne 1932, 68).
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settled in Chitral and were gradually incorporated into the region’s fluid and
changing system of status hierarchy. Some of the Afghan incomers, especially
those from more noble backgrounds, were presented with gifts of land (mehra-
bani zameen) by the Mehtar of Chitral; others became the serfs (chirmuzh) and
servants (khanazad) of Chitrali gentry families.31
The forms taken by Chitralis’ narrations of their own transregional pasts vary
greatly and have very different implications for local forms of self-understanding.
Folk from relatively high-status backgrounds claim descent from noble families
that were once influential in the court of Badakshan, until they fell out of
favor with the realm’s monarch, or mir. Muhsin, a Sunni Chitrali man in his
mid-thirties, told me that his grandfather came to Chitral from Badakshan
after having had a dispute with themir of Badakshan. His grandfather was appar-
ently welcomed to Chitral by theMehtar of the time, who gave him land and even
arranged for him to marry a local girl. As a child, Muhsin often traveled to Badak-
shan in order to visit his relatives; during the course of these visits, he learned to
speak fluent Dari. In Chitral, however, Muhsin and all his brothers say they are
Chitrali, speak Khowar, and have married Chitrali women. Nevertheless, they are
now reactivating their familial ties in Afghanistan. Muhsin’s brother, Sajjid, tra-
veled to Kabul in 2004 with the aim of finding employment as a vehicle mechanic
in the city’s rapidly expanding nongovernmental sector. In Kabul, he stayed with
some of his Afghan relatives who were originally from Badakshan but had moved
to Kabul in the 1970s. Muhsin himself had worked as a tour guide for foreign
journalists: He took journalists across Afghan Badakshan and simultaneously
built up an expansive network of connections with the region’s mujahidin com-
manders. In later years, he used his in-depth knowledge of Badakshan’s conflicts
to secure legal residency status as an Afghan refugee in a European country.
The reactivation of ties with Afghanistan by Chitrali families was not, then,
simply confined to Chitralis hosting Afghan “refugees” in their houses. Many
Chitralis have visited Afghanistan over the past two decades. Their travels,
I now suggest, play an active role in making and sustaining their place in what
Wakhi-speaking people I met in Tajikistan also told me that families from their villages had fled to
Chitral on their region’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Douglas Northrop (2004) also high-
lights the importance of movements of people, things, and idea across the Soviet–Afghanistan
border in the early years of the Soviet Union.
31An anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Asian Studies brought my attention to the degree to
which the colonial state may have played an active role in persuading the rulers of Chitral and other
princely states in modern-day northern Pakistan to gift land to Afghans who emigrated from their
home region’s after both the third Afghan war and the expansion of Soviet Union into southern Taji-
kistan. This article’s focus on the present-day modes of understandings deployed by Chitralis to
think about their transregional pasts prevents a more detailed exploration of this issue. Neverthe-
less, during future research, I hope to pursue this line of historical enquiry in greater detail. Ghulam
Murtaza also documents Chitral’s Mehtar, between 1856 and 1892, granting Ismai’li Seyyids from
Badakshan “asylum” and property following an “onslaught” by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (Murtaza
1982, 223).
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I am calling a Persianate cultural zone.32 Travel is a well-documented dimension
of Indo-Persian literary culture (Alam and Subrahmanyam 2004)—tales of
journeys (safar) are also a frequent source of Chitrali conversation.33 The
mother of the Ismai’li Seyyid family with whom I stay, now in her early sixties,
often tells me that her mother was from Badakshan and spoke fluent Farsi,
but only very rough (shum) Khowar. She was the daughter of well-known and
influential family of Badakshani Ismai’li Seyyids who was given in marriage to
Chitrali Sunni gentry family. This Seyyid family hails from cluster of villages
known as Zebak, and they are widely respected as pirs by many Ismai’li through-
out Chitral, Badakshan, and southern Tajikistan, where they have vast networks
of followers (muridan).
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the eldest son
in the household, Ameen, made an epic two-month horseback journey to visit the
house of his maternal grandmother, as well as to find a Badakshani horse,
renowned in Chitral for being excellent for high-altitude polo. Ameen continues
to tell stories rich with vivid images about the authority of the pir of Zebak, who
had, indeed, presented him with gifts of horses, yaks, and cows. Since the early
1920s, when Bombay-based Ismai’li “community” leaders actively sought to
strengthen their channels of communication with Chitrali Ismai’lis, the authority
to transmit both the edicts or farmans of the Aga Khan and Ismai’li religious
knowledge more generally, has, in Chitral, become increasingly the preserve of
the Ismai’li Tariqa Board. This is the international Ismai’li body that coordinates,
among other things, the religious education of the world’s Ismai’lis. In contrast,
the spiritual authority of Afghanistan’s pirs remained far less contested by global
developments in the organization of the world’s Ismai’lis until the U.S.-led defeat
of the Taliban in 2001–02, which made it possible for Ismai’li institutions to play a
more significant role in the transmission of religious knowledge to Ismai’lis within
Afghanistan.
Ameen’s accounts of Badakshani religious life emphasize the differences that
he saw in the form of religious authority in Chitral and Badakshan. They amount
to a close and almost ethnographic description of this familiarly exotic realm.
Ameen also shared much information about the current nature of Ismai’li experi-
ence in Badakshan with his fellow Rowshan people: He told his fellow Ismai’li
village people that he had seen the Sunni mujahideen beating up Badakshani
Ismai’li villagers, thereby sharing with fellow villagers firsthand knowledge
about the Afghan refugees currently staying in their houses and working in
their fields.
The presence of Afghan refugees in Rowshan thus reactivated Chitrali
kinship connections with Afghanistan and memories of transregional family
32For studies of the complex, changing and dynamic ways in which premodern Persianate influ-
ences have shaped modern Iran, see Afsaneh Najmabadi (2005) and Kathryn Babayan (2002).
33On travel and mobility in the Muslim world, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori (1990).
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histories. This process of reactivation, however, was not always a sweetly reason-
able one. The descendents of the “servants” of Chitral’s one-time gentry-like
families have invested considerable energy into concealing their Wakhik family
backgrounds. For such folk, the historical consciousness of Chitral’s connections
with the wider region can undermine their attempts to transform their position in
Chitral’s shifting system of status hierarchy.
Pachambeh Khan, a man from Zebak in his mid-thirties who fled Afghan
Badakshan complaining of the cruel treatment of Ismai’lis there by powerful
Sunnimujahideen commanders, stayed with a Rowshan family who were the des-
cendents of mid-twentieth-century Ismai’li migrants from Badakshan. This
family is poor by Rowshan standards: Fourteen people in total, they live in a
small house, own very little land, and, when Pachambeh Khan was staying with
them, none of the family members held paid employment. Pachambeh Khan
was a well-incorporated feature of this family’s life, however. The family’s three
daughters, all of marriageable age, did not observe purdah before him; they
also cared for him when he fell ill—purportedly because he had fallen in love
with a beautiful Chitrali girl from a nearby hamlet. The intimate nature of this
family’s relationship with Pachambeh Khan the Zebaki was the cause of much dis-
cussion in Rowshan. This family’s decision to host Pachambeh Khan “proved,”
according to one man with whom I spoke, who at the time was in his mid-eighties
and from a wealthy and onetime lordly family, that these folk were not real (asil)
Rowshan people at all but “dirty Wakhiks” (wahluchi wakhi). When I visited him
in his home, he often told me that these families had once been “homeless
beggars” (gadai tesh mashkak) until they were given enough land on which to
survive by Rowshan villagers.
Talking about extra-Chitrali family backgrounds is a sensitive dimension of
village conversation, which is important because of its role in local understand-
ings of Afghan, Tajik, and Wakhi “others.” Equally important, however, are the
ways in which such conversations feed into the construction of shared forms of
Chitrali selfhood and the internal divisions, boundaries, tensions and ambiguities
surrounding authenticity that are central to these. Having and admitting to a
transregional past may confer prestige, knowledge of distant places and con-
ditions, and access to unique forms of spiritual insight. Yet it may also be unwel-
come proof of a family’s low status in the past, their tenuous claims to the village’s
land and its water resources, and the possibility that the moral unit of the village is
being threatened by the presence of insincere interlopers bent on concealing
their hybrid pasts.
These dualistic understandings of transregionality, “openness,” and
“closedness”—what Ho refers to as “dynamic signification” that marks the
“movements of individuals” and presides over “the coming and goings of numer-
ous persons across space, time and culture” (2006, 115)—illustrates the extent to
which some Chitralis contrast their cosmopolitanism with others who cannot or
have not participated in such forms of mobility. At the same time, it also points
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toward the ways in which Chitralis make finite distinctions between different
forms of transregional mobility and the types of people who undertake them.
While some types of mobility, when undertaken by men from lordly or religious
families, are glamorous, personally enriching, and motivated by noble causes,
others are practiced by the wrong people, for the wrong reasons, and in the
wrong way. Villagers whose family members had once served as the laborers
and domestic servants of the region’s lordly families, a practice transformed
though not eliminated by introduction of government land reform legislation
in the 1970s, are especially open to such accusations of improper mobility.
The narration, therefore, of twentieth-century histories of movement from
the Wakhan to Chitral is a matter of extreme sensitivity in Rowshan today.
Indeed, many people go to great lengths to deny that they are Wakhiks at
all—one woman who had migrated with her father to Chitral as a young child fre-
quently became angry with villagers if they said she was Wakhik. Since I first
visited Chitral in 1995, I have often talked with Rowshan villagers about their
extra-Chitrali origins, yet it is only in recent years that I have heard stories
about my friends’ “Wakhik” grandparents. One man in particular, Lablabu
Khan, has given me many insights into this domain of Chitral life and history.
In his early forties, and from a village in a Chitrali village close to Afghanistan,
Lablabu now lives in Rowshan, where he is low-grade government employee.
His wife’s mother came to Chitral from the Wakhan when she was ten years
old—her father, she told me, was fleeing conscription in the Afghan army. His
mother-in-law worked in the household of one of the region’s gentry-like families.
Then, as now, her family lived on a small plot of land, which they had been
“given” by the lordly family for whom they worked. In recent years, they, like
many other such Chitrali families, have benefited from the opportunities for
social mobility provided to Chitralis by raising literacy levels, employment in
the local wing of the Pakistan army (the Chitral Scouts) and police, and labor
migration to Pakistan’s cities. Two of her sons, although not formally educated,
became junior commissioned officers in the Chitral Scouts until they retired
and built impressive houses on land overlooking not only their ancestral home
but also that of their onetime lords; her other two sons work as medical tech-
nicians in Karachi’s prestigious Aga Khan University.
Lablabu Khan often tells me that he considers talking about matters of status,
family descent, and hierarchy to be a highly impolite feature of Chitrali conversa-
tion (mashkulque). Hearing conversations about such matters, he tells me, makes
his brain “cook” and go “mad.” When staying in Rowshan in order to undertake
his duties in the government department for which he works, he stays in small
house built of mud bricks on land owned by his boss. He frequently complains
that although his boss is kind and honorable, this man’s nephews treat him as
their uncle’s serf, constantly asking him to do odd jobs and provide them with
bottles of home-brewed raisin wine (kishmish orgh) without payment. These
requests are a source of great irritation to Lablabu’s eighteen-year-old daughter,
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educated as far as higher secondary level, who frequently tells her father that he
should refuse to work for this family for free and consider them his equals and not
his bosses (lalan).
The relatives of the pir of Zebak often told Rowshan villagers and me proudly
about their connections in Afghanistan. They presented themselves as people
with historically significant pasts that connect them to different places and
mean that they are familiar with “conditions and personalities” (Ho 2006, 115)
beyond the immediate setting of Rowshan and Chitral. Lablabu Khan, in
contrast, urged me to write about and bring to the surface the cruel ways in
which Chitralis talked about Wakhiks. In so doing, he highlighted his own
recognition of the dynamic tension between “openness and closedness” (Ho
2006, 198) that is a prominent feature of the cosmopolitan discourses of Chitral’s
higher-status transregional families. In contrast to Rowshan’s Seyyid families,
then, men such as Lablabu Khan consider the reactivation of memories about
familial connections with Afghanistan and the Wakhan to be sensitive and even
dangerous—they have the capacity to undo the active and often disappointed
attempts made by such men to transform their families’ place in Chitral’s shifting
system of status and descent.
Interactions between Chitralis and refugees invoked different types of transna-
tional self-understanding that were weighted with importance for different reasons.
Some villagers have openly sought to reactivate their ties with Afghanistan and
sometimes even treated these as a critical economic resource. The presence of
Afghan refugees fromBadakshan stimulated someChitralis to travel to Afghanistan,
not to fight in the country’s jihad but to visit their relatives. The capacity to make
such journeys, enjoy the hospitality and even command the respect of distant
relatives, and display the gifts with which they were presented, was a source of
glamour for Rowshan villagers. Others, in contrast, have sought to suppress
their connections with the wider Farsi-speaking world: Being labeled an
Afghan by one’s fellow Chitralis also has very negative implications for certain
groups of people in Chitral today.
CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, Chitrali villages have employed post-Soviet Tajik
men in their fields, learned Dari from Afghans, and embarked on journeys to
their ancestral villages in northeastern Afghanistan. All this movement
between deeply connected yet also discontinuous settings has stimulated prac-
tices of cosmopolitanism that valorize people’s ability to move with art and skill
across their wider world. These cosmopolitan practices are neither the one-
dimensional products of civil war nor the straightforward outcomes of global
migration. They bear the imprint, rather, of older cultural influences—Persianate
practices of travel, for example. Both nation-states and foreign powers frequently
240 Magnus Marsden
interpret these patterns of mobility and the relations they forge betweenMuslims
from apparently incompatible backgrounds as a dangerous source of instability.
Yet local faces of the Pakistan state collaborate with the region’s mobile
Muslims, while some international nongovernmental organizations have also
sought to instrumentally generate transregional forms of connectivity.
In short, the intimate relations and ever-changing life histories and experi-
ences of people in this region illuminate much about their experiences of
some of the most momentous events of the past three decades, the effects of
these on the relationships between these transregional societies, and people’s
ways of being Muslim. The multidimensional ways of being Muslim documented
here should certainly not be seen in terms of their unbounded fluidity. Nor have
no Muslims in the region embraced radical ways of acting within and against the
world around them. Rather, people living in this expansive transregional setting
frequently shift between very different indexes and ways of being Muslim during
the course of their daily lives. In so doing, they forge intricate, intimate, and
dynamic relations with other Muslims, not only from different places, ethnolin-
guistic groups, or confessional backgrounds, but also with very different life his-
tories and personal experiences of this transregional space. Importantly, most of
the region’s Muslims do not simply “smooth over” their experience of this com-
plexity by adhering to rule-bound forms or “de-culturalized” forms of “global”
Islam (Ossman 2007, 8). Rather, these relations lead to the production of inter-
twining forms of complicity and critical engagement with the forces behind the
momentous changes that the region’s people have experienced over the last
thirty years. The indexes of being Muslim that the region’s people enact are
cross-cut by competing forms of sectarian, social, and ethnolinguistic distinction;
they also bear the imprint of the differential effects of both British and Soviet
Imperial expansion. Resultantly, as Muslims move between their region’s differ-
ent spaces, they identify with very different values, traditions and things—some
of which stand in stark contrast to one another. Sulton, for example, joined the
Taliban but did not refashion his Muslim self according to ultra-orthodox
forms of doctrinal Islam. Instead, he tactically switched between different ways
of being Muslim, and, in the course of doing so, he identified with a homogenous
Ismai’li community, the Sunni Taliban, and a local smuggler of apricot schnapps.
These shifting ways of being Muslim and the modes of identification they
stimulate are thus always about more complex processes than the ways in
which Muslims attach meanings to their “identities.” Rather, Muslims living in
this transregional setting fashion personal ways of being Muslim that are richly
informed by and facilitate projects of identification with a diverse range of intel-
lectual, cultural, and aesthetic influences and standards. These include local
musical traditions that build on an expansive Persianate Sufic poetic heritage
and Persianate styles of miniature painting that have interacted with Socialist
art genres. The modes of identification that such ways of being Muslim stimulate,
therefore, are richly nourished by complex processes of interaction and
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exchange. Thus, in this connected yet discontinuous cultural, political, and
religious setting in which transregional forms of mobility are a pervasive
feature of everyday life, I have focused on the everyday factors that lead
people to enact—although not necessarily embrace—shifting political, religious,
and moral orientations or dispositions at contingent historical and personal junc-
tures and in particular places.
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